Download PDF If We Can Keep It How the Republic Collapsed and How it Might Be Saved Michael Tomasky 9781631494086 Books

Product details Hardcover 288 pages Publisher Liveright; 1 edition (February 5, 2019) Language English ISBN-10 1631494082

If We Can Keep It How the Republic Collapsed and How it Might Be Saved Michael Tomasky 9781631494086 Books Reviews

• No doubt our American experiment in representative democracy is indeed an experiment that could fail. However, our collective experiment somehow managed to survive the Civil War (1861-1865). So we might wonder, “What will it take to show that our American experiment in representative democracy has at long last finally failed beyond any hope of recovery?”
  
  In effect, Michael Tomasky ponders something like this question in his new book If We Can Keep It How the Republic Collapsed and How It Might Be Saved (Liveright/ Norton, 2019). He takes his main title from Benjamin Franklin’s statement on September 17, 1787, the final day of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. A lady asked him, “‘Well, doctor, what have we got – a republic or a monarchy?’” He replied, “‘A republic, if you can keep it’” (quoted on pages xxvi-xxvii).
  
  For Tomasky, the central question that he focuses on concerns the quality of our republic. However, even though he forthrightly argues that the quality of our republic is not high at the present time (from 1980s to the present), he does not argue that we are drifting toward monarchy. Just to be clear, he also does not argue that our American experiment in representative democracy has at long last finally failed.
  
  Instead, Tomasky argues that the “representative” quality in our republic has been skewed – and that certain things now need to be corrected. In light of his historical analysis of how our republic has evolved over the years, he suggests a fourteen-point agenda of things we can do to reduce the contemporary trend of political polarization (from the 1980s to the present) that he finds so disturbing. However, I do not find his fourteen-point agenda convincing (pages xvii-xvii; and pages 189-237), so I am not even going to discuss further, except once below in passing.
  
  Instead, I want to call attention to Tomasky’s own account of the previous period that he refers to as the Age of Consensus (1933-1980 – almost half a century). Tomasky discusses this previous period in considerable detail (pages 61-151). Of course, even during this so-called Age of Consensus, the Republican Party had rabble-rousers such as John Birch and Barry Goldwater. So we should not be surprised that the Republican Party in the Tomasky’s so-called Age of Fracture (1980 to the present) has rabble-rousers such as Newt Gingrich and Donald Trump.
  
  Of course, pro-and-con debate in our legislative assemblies always involves polar arguments to one degree or another. When Tomasky refers to political polarization, he means that the polar arguments are at odds to a strong degree. As we might expect, Tomasky acknowledges certain examples of so-called polarization between 1787 and 2016 – fifty-five examples, to be exact (listed and succinctly described on pages xi-xvi; discussed later in the book; the year 2016 is Tomasky’s cutoff year for examples).
  
  But how is your math? What is the frequency rate of examples per year based on Tomasky’s constructs? He is the one making the constructs involved here. He has constructed the periods, and he has deemed which examples to use to exemplify polarized politics. So let’s do the math based on his constructs.
  
  First, let’s work out the overall annualized rate of the fifty-five examples of political polarization between 1787 and 2016 55 (examples) divided by 229 (years) = 24% (annualized rate of examples of political polarization).
  
  Next, let’s work out the annualized rate of the examples for each of the four periods that Tomasky has constructed.
  
  (I) The Age of Creation nineteen examples of polarization between 1787-1865; 19 divided by 78 = 24%.
  (II) The Age of Power seven examples of polarization between 1865-1929; 7 divided by 64 = 11%.
  (III) The Age of Consensus sixteen examples between 1933-1980; 16 divided by 47 = 34%.
  (IV) The Age of Fracture thirteen examples between 1980-2016; 13 divided by 36 = 36%.
  
  But the last two rates do not strike me as significantly different from one another, but as roughly comparable to one another. So what exactly does Tomasky find so disturbing? After all, he sets up a strong contrast between the two periods by referring to them, respectively, as the Age of Consensus and the Age of Fracture.
  
  In connection with the Age of Consensus, Tomasky refers, among other works, to Wendy L. Wall’s book Inventing the “American Way” The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the Civil Rights Movement (Oxford University Press, 2008). According to Tomasky, Wall describes Margaret Mead’s 1942 book And Keep Your Powder Dry as “‘the first book to apply the revised notion of national character to U.S. society’” (quoted by Tomasky on page 73; quoted from Wall’s book, page 91).
  
  After the war effort was successful, the so-called “ugly American” emerged as the dark side of that “American way” that Mead had helped invent during the war effort, and after the war, certain academics tended to pivot toward critique of that “American way” – the spirit of critique that the black civil rights movement helped advance in the postwar years.
  
  For further discussion of the “ugly American,” see Walter J. Ong’s frequently reprinted article “That American Way” in the Jesuit-sponsored magazine America, volume 100, number 8 (November 22, 1958) pages 238-241. Also see his reply to letters about his article in America, volume 100, number 18 (February 7, 1959) page 548.
  
  In connection with the Age of Fracture, Tomasky refers, among other works, to Daniel T. Rodgers’ book Age of Fracture (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).
  
  But for a more perceptive discussion of the postwar years, see Grace Elizabeth Hale’s book A Nation of Outsiders How the White Middle Class Fell in Love with Rebellion in Postwar America (Oxford University Press, 2011).
  
  Ong’s perceptive essay “The Barbarian Within Outsiders Inside Society Today” in his book The Barbarian Within And Other Fugitive Essays and Studies (Macmillan, 1962, pages 260-285) is important for understanding the widespread postwar spirit that Hale describes in circumstantial detail.
  
  Ong’s perceptive essay is reprinted in An Ong Reader Challenges for Further Inquiry (Hampton Press, 2002, pages 277-300).
  
  I do not think that the postwar spirit that Hale discusses in circumstantial detail has come to an end yet, which is why I consider Ong’s perceptive essay to be so important for understanding it. Of course, critiques of American culture in behalf of certain real or imagined outsiders inside American society today may evoke the spirit of pro-and-con debate about the merits of the critiques. As to the possibility of critiques galvanizing social change, as the black civil-rights movement did, we should remember that significant social changes must be negotiated.
  
  For a relevant discussion of the so-called “barbarian” imagery that Ong uses, see Edith Hall’s thoroughly researched book Inventing the Barbarian Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy (Oxford Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 1989).
  
  In any event, the terminology that Tomasky uses to name the two most recent of his four periods of time is not terminology that he himself coined, but terminology that he borrowed from certain other authors. But he did construct the boundary years for each of his four periods, and he alone selected the examples he deemed worthy of mention as examples of political polarization.
  
  However, as I mentioned above, our collective American experiment in representative democracy somehow managed to survive the Civil War (1862-1865). Consequently, I suspect that it will also somehow manage to survive the thirteen examples of so-called polarization between 1980 and 2016 that Tomasky discusses.
  
  In any event, for Tomasky, our contemporary polarization is sub-optimal – because “it’s tribal” (that is, it involves people voting “along group lines”; page xxi). Tomasky says, “Now, we have party tribalism” (page xxi).
  
  According to Tomasky, so-called party tribalism involves all people who say that they belong to one or the other major political party voting along party lines. But voting along party lines eliminates intra-party polarization and tends to invite inter-party polarization. However, Tomasky would prefer to see more intra-party polarization. Indeed, he sees this as the optimal alternative to so-called party tribalism.
  
  I admit that the term “tribalism” does not sound attractive, especially when you operationally define it as eliminating intra-party polarization, as Tomasky does so define it. However, I am not willing to construct an alternative definition of “tribalism” just to set up a way in which I could argue against Tomasky’s argument. Suffice it to say that I do not find the denigrating term “tribalism” attractive enough to use it in my own writings. Similarly, I also do not find the denigrating term “populism” attractive enough to use it in my own writings.
  
  In the 2016 presidential election, the crook Donald J. Trump, the crooked real estate developer who used legal bankruptcy to shaft people, was the Republican Party’s presidential candidate. In both the primary and the general campaign, he drew large crowds to his rallies. Consequently, certain commentators described him as campaigning on a form of “populism” and/or “tribalism.”
  
  By contrast, former secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton, the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, rarely drew large crowds to her rallies. Consequently, commentators did not describe her as campaigning of a form of “populism” and/or “tribalism.” Fine. I can understand that much. But do commentators use comparably denigrating terms to characterize the candidate of a major political party who does not draw large crowds to her political rallies? What kind of alleged "-ism" was she campaigning on?
  
  The point of my thought experiment here is that commentators who use the denigrating terms “tribalism” and/or “populism” should be equal-opportunity-employers of denigrating terms to denigrate a candidate whose political rallies do not draw many people and do not inspire much enthusiasm.
  
  I am belaboring this point about Hillary Clinton’s uninspiring 2016 presidential campaign because Tomasky, like many other commentators, prefers to emphasize her “victory” in the popular vote (see, for example, page xvi) – because this way of proceeding bolsters point number six in his “Fourteen-Point Agenda to Reduce Polarization” (pages xvii-xviii). Point six says, “Get Rid of the Electoral College (or Make It Obey the Popular Vote).” Of course, other authors have also said as much in light of Trump’s electoral-college victory in the 2016 presidential election.
  
  Thus far, my criticism of Tomasky’s fourteen-point agenda to supposedly reduce political polarization can be boiled down to saying that he is a hopelessly utopian.
  
  So let’s look at what he himself says about political change “Politicians don’t lead. They follow. When outside forces demand change, then and only then do politicians get down to the business of making changes” (page xxv).
  
  I take this statement to mean that Tomasky hopes that his book will contribute to the so-called “outside forces” that demand change from our elected politicians.
  
  Finally, should we be concerned about Tomasky’s fifty-five examples of what he refers to as polarization? As we just noted, he himself says, “Politicians do not lead. They follow. When outside forces demand change, then and only then do politicians get down to the business of making changes” (page xxv). By this logic, it would seem to follow that political polarization means that “outside forces” have not yet been sufficient enough to demand change.
• Michael Tomasky's book is for those people who truly want to learn the history and details about why our nation is at this perilous, hyperpartisan place and what we can do from a practical point of view to change things for the better. In reality I bet most people on left and right agree with Tomasky's recommendations to end polarization like ending partisan gerrymandering and requiring all Americans to serve one year of public service. And Tomasky explores something that is often overlooked when discussing how we got to the place we are today and that's the ending of the Fairness Doctrine which gave rise to hyperpartisan media- especially coming from the right. But regardless of your political views, this book will make you smarter and make you think. Both things vitally needed in today's America.
• Michael Tomasky's IF WE CAN KEEP IT is essential and timely. For those who are familiar and those who are less familiar with a sweeping tour of American history and politics, this book is comprised of your most necessary education. Funny, fascinating, shocking and optimistic. It is profound to understand that what we are experiencing now has been a part of the great democratic experiment from the start "...Division is the American condition. We’ve been divided since the Hamiltonians, the coastal elites, and the Jeffersonians, the country folk, the yeoman farmers, were at each other’s throats in the 1790’s. Things stayed that way for decades. Then, in the 20th century, the Depression and World War II brought people together and provided a kind of civic glue The generation that had fought the Nazis and fascist Japan had a perspective on life that prevented them from thinking of the people across the aisle as enemies. But once that generation passed the torch to a new generation, it all came unglued... — for now, we’re stuck here..." IF WE CAN KEEP IT provides pragmatic ways to evolve out of our current quagmire. Read Tomasky's new book before Election Day 2020, PLEASE !
• Michael Tomasky's insightful "If We Can Keep It" is required reading for anyone interested in The Age of Trump and how we got here. Tracing the nation's present civic turmoil to its origins,
  Tomasky re-appraises often-overlooked but critical turning points in U.S. history to argue compellingly that our current partisan passions are no exception, but rather reflect the reality of American politics from the outset. In a trenchant analysis, he posits that it is the post-World War II consensus, which many of us consider a model of inevitable progress, that is the aberration. In doing so, Tomasky offers a cogent, stimulating and original take on U.S. history that may prompt us to rethink our assumptions concerning America's past and consider some thoughtful options about it future.
• A precise, meticulous and easily digestible treatise on the history polarization and the best ways to fix it. I am an amateur wonk, so I feel it necessary to share this book with everyone I know that has even the slightest interest in American politics.
• Tomasky's profound yet comfortable mastery of U.S. history will give you a deep understanding of the roots of our country's divisions, along with a possible path forward.